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This Is An Uprising: Pulling Away The Pillars Of Support

July 16, 2018

(One in a series of posts on Mark & Paul Engler’s 2016 book, This Is An Uprising: How Nonviolent Revolt Is Shaping The Twenty-First Century.)

Mao Xedong summed up the monolithic understanding of power with his famous saying that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun“.

Gene Sharp disagreed. In his definition of the social view of power, Sharp argued, Obedience (emphasis added) is at the heart of political power. Rulers or other command systems, despite appearances, [are] dependent on the population’s goodwill, decisions, and support.” (p. 91)

His disciple, US Army Colonel (retired) Robert Helvey, added a valuable corollary to the social view of power in his 2001 book, On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict, with his elaboration of the image of “pillars of support” on which any ruler/commander rests.

Here’s how the Englers describe the concept of “pillars of support” and its utility for strategists of change:

“The pillars concept offers a catchy visual metaphor for the social theory of power. Imagine the various institutions of society as columns holding up the roof of a Roman temple. Social movements are pulling at the various columns. If they remove one or two of the pillars of support, the building would be weakened, but it might still stand. However, if people pull out enough of the pillars, the temple is sure to topple, and the movements will triumph.

If we imagine a hated dictator sitting on top of the temple, confidently surveying his dominion, the image of the building’s sudden collapse—and the tyrant’s resultant tumble—becomes all the more satisfying. In a democratic society, the result of the pillars falling might not be a change of regime, and yet the results can be just as profound: the removal of social supports for the status quo can mean the end of a system such as Jim Crow segregation, for example.

Beyond providing an entertaining exercise in visualization, the idea of the pillars of support is helpful in several ways. As a refinement of Sharp’s theory of power, it highlights the fact that people do  not merely interact with a regime as individuals. Instead, their decisions about when and how they might cooperate are channeled through their various social and professional roles. The pillars allow for better strategic thinking on the part of those trying to force change. Activists can more clearly predict what it will take for a regime to fall. They can scheme about how they might undermine one or more of the various sources of social support for the system—removing the backing of the clergy, for example, or prodding the press to adopt a more critical posture—and thus place the rulers on an ever-wobblier foundation” (p. 92)

In Otpor’s campaign to topple Milosevic, independent media, popular culture (e.g., music, theater), and universities were the first pillars to fall. Harder to topple, but ultimately decisive, were the army (filled with draftees discontented with Milosevic’s serial wars) and the police (professionals fearful of losing their jobs, and therefore harder to persuade).

While weakening the many pillars of support holding up the Serbian regime was a gradual process, the Englers point out that “When Milosevic refused to accept the results of the election, institutions began to withdraw their support at a furious pace, with union members going on strike and religious leaders calling for the president to step down.” (p. 94)

Provocatively (at least for their audience of organizers, activists and leaders in democratic nations), the Englers use the successful campaign to legalize same-sex marriage in the United States as an illustration of “advancing a transformational agenda,…swaying public opinion and pulling the pillars of support”. (p. 283)

In 2011, a decade after Evan Wolfson founded Freedom To Marry, the campaign for marriage equality in the US had succeeded in a bare handful of states, most in New England (far from the nation’s mainstream). Many more states had passed—by legislation, referendum or constitutional amendment—laws explicitly banning or repealing recognition of same-sex marriage. But, significantly, these defeats did not reflect the slowly, steadily changing public opinion in favor of marriage equality. Nor did they reflect the growing number of institutional sources of power (religious denominations, legal associations, major corporations, etc.) that had withdrawn their support for an opposite-sex-only marriage regime.

As with the Serbian experience, the Englers argue, when the end came for the old regime, it came quickly:

“In 2011, for the first time, polls showed public support for same-sex marriage to be over 50 percent…. As the temple began to quiver, pillars started falling like dominoes, toppling in areas including local government, business, religious organizations, the military, professional sports, and even conservative political groups.” (p. 104)

“The metaphor of falling pillars shows how, even prior to the 2015 Supreme Court ruling, the gains in the fight for marriage equality had been overdetermined. These advances were triggered in multiple, reinforcing ways. To focus solely on the transactional details of the individual court cases, ballot initiatives, and legislative maneuvers that came at the conclusion of the struggle is to miss a key point: these fights took place in a landscape that had already been transformed. As Richard Kim wrote in 2013, ‘Gay marriage isn’t winning the day because of some singularly persuasive legal argument; it’s winning because the battleground has shifted from the court of law to the court of public opinion.’

Or, as Wolfson put it, ‘We had persuaded the country, and the courts followed.'” (pp. 106-07)

Posts in this series:

From → Books, History, Politics

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